8° 2          1'58

58°21' N / 11°56' E
Swedish Merchant Ship looses during
The Second World War
 
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      Immediately following the outbreak of the Second World War, Sweden concluded war-trade agreements with Great Britain and Germany, which anticipated largely unchanged trade with both sides during the conflict.

The events of 9 April 1940, the date of the German invasion of Denmark and Norway, completely upset Sweden's commercial situation. Great Britain stopped all vessels sailing to Scandinavia and the Germans laid a mine barrier in the Skagerrak and forbade all shipping there. In effect, then, Sweden was faced with a double blockade. All trade with transoceanic nations was cut off and the Swedish merchant marine was split into two equal parts, half of it located in the British sphere of influence and half of it in the German.

During the prewar years approximately half of Sweden's foreign trade had been conducted with Great Britain and with transoceanic countries. If these trade routes were to remain closed, serious shortages of raw materials would develop in several vital sectors and Sweden would be forced to rely entirely on the German-dominated parts of Europe for her needs. This, of course, would also increase Sweden's political dependence on Germany.

     Swedish attempts to reopen trade with the west through the double blockade were initiated immediately, but they led to few results during the spring and summer of 1940. The Germans made such trade conditional upon Swedish vessels sailing without British permission, i.e. as blockade runners, and, in return for this concession, upon Sweden's agreeing de facto not to export goods to Germany's enemies. In spite of the fact that no Swedish exports could reach Great Britain in practice, the Swedish Government was unwilling to give any such promise, since it would have violated the Anglo-Swedish war-trade agreement.

For their part, the British had tightened the blockade after the German victory in the west during the summer of 1940 and they now allowed no supplies to reach the European continent. They reasoned that the Swedish export industry, just as those of the other neutral European countries, operated largely for the benefit of the Germans. According to this manner of thinking, all support of the Swedish economy would benefit Germany.

In spite of the negative attitudes of both the belligerents, in August 1940 the Swedish naval authorities obtained permission for the tanker Sveadrott to deliver one shipment of oil from the United States for use by the Swedish Navy. The Germans' basic attitude towards Swedish trade with overseas nations changed after the Battle of Britain when it became clear that the war would last a long time. Since Sweden was a part of the German economic system, they had nothing against Sweden's importing valuable materials from overseas with ships which were outside the Skagerrak barrier.

As a result of consistent Swedish pressure, which was exercised both through diplomatic channels and by private individuals such as shipping magnate Gunnar Carlsson and banker Marcus Wallenberg, the Ministry of Economic Warfare took up the question of Swedish over­seas trade in the autumn of 1940. There were differences of opinion within the Ministry, but Sir Charles Hambro and Henry Sporborg led the forces which argued that it was in Britain's interest to support Sweden so that she would remain neutral. This resulted at the end of November in Britain's offering Sweden the possibility of once again conducting overseas trade on certain conditions.

After negotiations with Germany, the head the Commercial Department of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Gunnar Hägglöf, and the other Swedish diplomats also gained German permission for overseas trade in the beginning of 1941. Strict conditions for this Gothenburg traffic (often called safe-conduct shipping in Sweden) were prescribed by both sides. An equal number of ships were to sail to and from Sweden. At first the number of ships sailing in each direction was limited to four per month, but this number was later raised to five and finally increased to six ships per month in each direction. Trade could be carried on only with neutral countries in America, Africa and Asia. Argentina became Sweden's largest trading partner within the scope of this program. Both belligerents controlled what Sweden imported and exported via this Gothenburg traffic; the British allowed Sweden to import oil only in return for certain quid pro quo.

The first interruption of the Gothenburg traffic occurred as early as April 1941. This was caused by the expansion of the German blockade area around the British Isles and all the way up to Greenland. Swedish ships were forced to pass through the German blockade area in the North Atlantic, but both the British and the Germans insisted upon prescribing the route for the ships in these waters. Since the routes prescribed by the two belligerents did not coincide, the Gothenburg traffic was interrupted for a period of three months.

The British demanded that Swedish ships pass through the British minefields stretching from the Orkney Islands to Greenland by way of Skopenfjord in the Faeroes. According to the British, this was the only place where the ships could pass through the mine barrier without having the Germans discover the location of the mines. The British also insisted that these Swedish vessels avoid all German-controlled ports.

The Germans for their part demanded that the ships pass through the Skagerrak barrier at Kristiansand, Norway, and then follow a route across the open seas between the Faeroes and Iceland. The British and German demands were entirely irreconcilable and the Swedes were not able to arrange any sort of compromise solution. It was only after Sweden's June 1941 concessions to Germany, primarily concerning the transit of the Engelbrecht Division from Norway to Finland, that the Germans for political reasons retreated in the Gothenburg traffic question and went along with the idea of Swedish vessels using the course through the Faeroes.

     During the remainder of 1941 and throughout 1942 the Gothenburg traffic continued without interruption. As a result of the war's expansion, however, the number of countries with which Sweden could trade was sharply reduced and the British cut down on the Swedish navicert quotas more and more. In order to secure continued deliveries (es­pecially of oil) from overseas and to increase them if possible, the Secretary-General of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Erik Boheman, flew to London and Washington during the autumn of 1942. The British took advantage of this demarche in order to request that the Swedes allow two Norwegian ships lying at anchor in Gothenburg, the Dicto and the Lionel, to sail for Great Britain with a cargo of ball bearings. At Great Britain's suggestion the Americans made this a condition for continued oil deliveries.

    The British issued an ultimatum to Sweden just before Christmas 1942; unless the Dicto and the Lionel were allowed to leave Sweden within two weeks, the British would cut off the Gothenburg traffic. At first the Swedish Government was unwilling to satisfy the British demand, since Foreign Minister Christian Günther had assured the German minister that the two Norwegian vessels would not be allowed to sail and the Germans had threatened to cut off the Gothenburg traffic if Sweden made any concessions to the Allies.

    Since both sides employed the same threat and the Gothenburg traffic would most likely be interrupted no matter what Sweden decided, the Government's decision could be seen as an indicator of Sweden's general political attitude towards the belligerents. After several dramatic days around the turn of the new year, the Government shifted its stance and decided to satisfy the British demand. This event marks a watershed in Sweden's wartime policy; Sweden had previously accepted various German demands on several occasions, but after this decision it was the increasingly extensive Allied demands which the Government satisfied.

      The Swedish decision to allow the Dicto and the Lionel to sail was communicated to Berlin without awaiting the results of negotiations underway there. As a reaction to this Swedish concession to the British, but under the guise of military necessity, the Germans interrupted the Gothenburg traffic. During the coming months the Germans were prepared to allow the renewal of the Gothenburg traffic if Sweden would grant some compensation to Germany for the broken promise about the two Norwegian ships. The Swedes, however, stubbornly refused to grant any compensation and in May 1943 the Germans finally allowed the Gothenburg traffic to continue out of fear that this matter would otherwise disturb Swedish-German relations in general. During the summer and autumn of 1943 there was an intensive specially marked. Both belligerents kept careful tabs on this traffic in order to guarantee that an equal number of vessels sailed to and from Sweden. In all there were 226 sailings to and 222 sailings from Sweden within the framework of the Gothenburg traffic. Nine ships were lost, claiming the lives of 142 men.

       Imports with the Gothenburg traffic were dominated by raw materials for consumer needs. The import of fodder, fats and raw materials for the textile and leather industries was especially important. Without a doubt, the most popular import article among the population was coffee. Probably the most important import article, however, was oil for the Swedish Navy and Air Force. Without this oil they would have been crippled, which naturally would have diminished Sweden's ability to oppose German demands.

       Exports via the Gothenburg traffic were much less important. In terms of value they measured only half that of the imported material. Because of the various limitations set by the belligerents, Sweden was largely limited to exporting paper and paper-pulp with the ships leaving Gothenburg. In many cases, however, the export of these products was a condition for importing others.

         The Gothenburg traffic was part of the diplomatic and politico economic maneuvering during the Second World War. It was affected by the developments on the larger scene and in some instances it itself affected the greater context. The Gothenburg traffic reflects Sweden's relations with the belligerent powers during the different phases of the war in an illuminating manner.